Pascal's Wager as a Decision Under Ignorance

In this paper, I examine Pascal's Wager as a decision problem where the uncertainty is massive, that is, as a decision under ignorance. I first present several reasons to support this interpretation. Then, I argue that wagering for God is the optimal act in a broad range of cases, according to two well-known criteria for decision-making: the Minimax Regret rule and the Hurwicz criterion. Given a Pascalian standard matrix, I also show that a tie between wagering for God and wagering against God is only possible under very narrow conditions when applying the Hurwicz criterion. Finally, I discuss three objections to these two versions of the Wager. The most pressing challenge comes from the Many-Gods objection. I conclude that this objection is even more challenging whenever one faces a situation of massive uncertainty about God's existence. I argue that addressing it requires a more detailed examination of the benefits of adopting a religious life compared to those of choosing non-theism, or an additional criterion that can break the tie between these options.