The Rhetoric of Evil: How a Theological Artefact Survived Secular Moral Thought

This paper advances a deflationary account of evil by treating it not as a moral primitive or metaphysical force but as a rhetorical artefact whose apparent explanatory power derives from theological residue rather than conceptual necessity. Drawing on Bernard Williams’ analysis of thick concepts, Arendt’s demythologising account of wrongdoing, and a layered MEOW framework for mediated encounter-structures, the essay argues that the term survives in secular discourse because it fills an epistemic and affective gap with a pseudo-explanation inherited from demonology. When confronted with acts that resist immediate articulation, “evil” substitutes metaphysical causation for structural, psychological, or institutional analysis, effectively casting perpetrators as marionettes animated by an occult force. This rhetorical compression licenses retributive responses, stabilises in-group boundaries, and operates as a moral shibboleth whose invocation signals allegiance more than understanding. While the phenomena commonly labelled “evil” are real and often overwhelming, the term itself offers expressive force rather than explanatory clarity. Its persistence reflects motivated conceptual inertia: a culturally convenient refusal to confront the causal networks that render extreme harm intelligible without recourse to supernatural vocabulary. Retiring the term is not a refusal to condemn atrocities but a commitment to more disciplined moral cartography—mapping the terrain without mythical monsters.