Belief, Agency, and the Spontaneity of Consciousness

Mental agency has recently become a prominent theme in the philosophy of mind. One of the most debated issues within this field is doxastic agency, which especially centers on whether we can believe at will. There are three typical positions on this issue. (1) Doxastic ballistic theory holds that agency is only involved in the preceding acts that lead to beliefs, while beliefs themselves lack agency. (2) Doxastic particularism argues that beliefs involve a sui generis form of agency distinct from the agency in everyday actions. (3) Doxastic voluntarism maintains that beliefs are subject to direct voluntary control. However, all three positions are unsatisfying in certain respects. This paper proposes an alternative approach: “doxastic spontaneism”, which offers a solution to the problem of doxastic agency. At its core lies Sartre’s account of the “spontaneity of consciousness”. Spontaneity is not mere instinct or automatic behavior, but pre-reflective self-determination directed toward certain ends. It constitutes the foundation of the will (which is reflective self-determination), representing a more fundamental form of mental agency than the will. Although beliefs are often beyond the direct control of the will, they nonetheless involve agency in the form of spontaneity.