Inductive Metaphysics in Contemporary Philosophy

In the first part of this chapter, the role and embeddedness of Inductive Metaphysics (IM) in contemporary philosophy are discussed, in comparison to competing metaphysical programs, including the relation to conceptual a priori metaphysics as well as to other a posteriori programs in metaphysics. The basic methodological principles of IM are explained, consisting of (1) the employment of inductive and abductive methods and (2) making use of empirical sources. In the second part, important challenges for the methodology of IM are investigated. These challenges arise from the fact that theories of IM have to be justified by abductive inferences that introduce new theoretical concepts. Two rationality criteria are proposed in order to distinguish scientifically meaningful metaphysical theories from pure speculations: (i) the unification of empirical facts or laws by metaphysical theories, and (ii) the independent testability of metaphysical theories by entailing use‑novel empirical consequences.