The Case for Enhancement and the Enlightenment: Foucault, Sorgner, and Transhumanism

This article addresses the philosophical tensions between Enlightenment ideals, particularly Kantian concepts of dignity and autonomy, and the evolving field of transhumanism. Kant’s belief that human dignity originates from rational autonomy and the capacity for self-governance sets a foundation for Enlightenment humanism, which posits that humans hold an exceptional place among beings. Contrasting this, Michel Foucault’s critique of Enlightenment humanism challenges the notion of a stable human essence, viewing “man” as a historically contingent construct subject to reinterpretation, particularly in the context of transhumanist enhancement. The discussion then extends to transhumanist ambitions, which aim to augment human capacities through technology but face significant questions about whether such enhancements uphold or redefine traditional values of dignity and autonomy. A central focus is Stefan L. Sorgner’s posthumanist critique, where he proposes “fictive autonomy” as a useful social construct rather than an inherent human quality, questioning whether autonomy can remain unchanged in a technologically enhanced future. Drawing on a Foucauldian perspective, this article examines both classic transhumanism and Sorgner’s adaptation, asking if either approach can genuinely reconcile with Enlightenment principles or if they risk destabilizing them. Through this lens, the article proposes that Foucauldian critique may offer a productive alternative for examining human enhancement without succumbing to contradictions inherent in the transhumanist project. Ultimately, I suggest that transhumanism, while promising to expand human potential, might need a redefined ethical framework that embraces contingency, finitude, and a revised understanding of autonomy beyond its Enlightenment origins.