Right and the Authorisation to Coerce

Kant conceptualises right in terms of an authorisation to use coercion. This has foundational significance for his whole practical philosophy. Yet he scarcely argues for this conceptualisation. "Quid juris?" – what title do we have to such a concept? This paper contrasts Kant’s quite distinct treatment of “lying from philanthropy” – or better, lying for the sake of right. If I cannot lie to uphold right, then how may I coerce? As Kant notes, lying is not usually a juridical wrong; we may choose whether to believe someone. By contrast, coercion represents a direct denial of freedom. Tamar Schapiro has interpreted Kant’s theory of action to provide a persuasive account of defensive lying. I suggest that defensive coercion be analysed on the same model, sharply distinguishing it from aggressive attempts. I also suggest that defensive acts invoke public right, just as private coercion opposes it, and highlight how this coheres with the principle that no person be a mere means for another.