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The Neutrality of Life
Some philosophers think that life is worth living not merely because of the goods and the bads within it, but also because life itself is good. I argue that such views face a dilemma: either (1) good human lives are worse than very long lives wholly devoid of pleasure, desire-satisfaction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very short lives containing nothing but suffering are worth living.
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