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Candlish's Bradley and his "regress"

Couvalis, George
PhilArchive · Papers
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philosophy
David Armstrong brought the so-called “Bradley regress” back into philosophical discussion. However, there has been little detailed discussion of Bradley’s claims and arguments. Stewart Candlish has presented a sympathetic account of Bradley. I take it that he is correct in his claims about Bradley’s views. I argue that by producing the closest method we have to a Bradley ideal experiment, we can perceive relations. Bradley is introducing the unwarranted assumption that for something to exist, it must be something like a traditional substance to claim that we do not perceive relations. He is violating his own claims about his ideal experiment. Further, he ignores the fact that many relations are spatial or temporal, a focus of Russell’s work. Once we realise that space and time (or space/time) are not substances in a traditional sense of “substance”, we are able to solve the problems posed by Bradley’s “regress”. Other problems can be solved by using the notion of “partial consideration”. However, Russell was not satisfied with his solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition.
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