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Forces Are Not Invariants
It is commonly assumed that fundamental forces correspond to invariant features of physical reality. In this paper, we show that this assumption cannot be sustained. Treating forces as invariants leads either to redundancy in constraint imposition or to hidden nonlocal dependence incompatible with locality. We argue that forces should instead be understood as representational artifacts arising from particular local descriptions, rather than as invariant structures. The result is eliminative: no alternative ontology of forces is proposed, only the conclusion that force realism is untenable.
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