Greco (2023) _Idealization in Epistemology_ and McKenna (2023) _Non-Ideal Epistemology_

Epistemology is rife with idealization. And, although concern about particular idealizations—logical omniscience, infinite iterations of common knowledge, and so on—is long-standing, systematic metaepistemological reflection has been lacking. This excellent new pair of books, Daniel Greco’s Idealization in Epistemology and Robin McKenna’s Non-Ideal Epistemology, aims to rectify this. Fruitfully, these authors take cues from different corners of philosophical inquiry, drawing on rich literatures within philosophy of science and political philosophy, respectively. Given their far-flung starting points, discovering strong parallels and congruities between these projects is surprising. In this review, therefore, I highlight these resonances, though not to the neglect of dissonance.