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Beyond the Law of Identity: The Framework of "Being as Relativity" Discussing Hume's Problem through the Lens of the Zhou Yi

Dust, Mundane
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philosophy
This paper aims to reveal the limitations of the traditional logical cornerstone—the Law of Identity—which stem from elevating static presuppositions to an absolute status, thereby creating difficulties when dealing with a dynamic and relational world. To address this, we propose a "Benchmark-Based Perspectivism" framework based on the ontological principle that "To Be is to Be Relative," conceptualizing existence as a relational phenomenon and redefining objectivity as dynamic consensus. Within this framework, Hume's "Is-Ought" problem and the moral luck paradox can be systematically resolved. Ultimately, this paper does not seek to negate the Law of Identity but to delineate its domain of validity, arguing that the future development of rational inquiry lies in the conscious division and integration of static analysis and dynamic consensus thinking. (These articles are just records of places I’ve passed by. Don’t take them too seriously, my friend — they may be full of mistakes. Trust yourself. If you want to find my recent location, please check the pinned post or updates on my homepage.)
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