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La objeción de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia
This paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism to the solution to Meno’s Paradox suggested by Plato. According to Aristotle, when Plato says that reminiscence (anámnēsis) is achieved, what is actually achieved is induction (epagōgê). Our interpretation is based on two aspects: (1) semantic criticism, since Plato’s use of the term anámnēsis is unusual; and (2) the theory is not able to give an adequate explanation of the effective discovery.
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