Some notes on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods

In his preface to the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein sets forth the book as a work with the intent to draw a limit to the expression of thoughts. He further argues that such a limit could only be drawn in language and, therefore, only nonsense would lie on the other side of it. However, as Wittgenstein himself accepts in his work, the very Tractatus, and the entire philosophy alike, are beyond the limit drawn for the expression of thoughts. Given such a paradox, contemporary readers carry on the debate concerning what Wittgenstein understood as the limits of language. In this paper, I state that regardless of how the limits to expression are understood, Wittgenstein has never respected them before or after writing the Tractatus. Besides, against the common opinion concerning the existence of genuine philosophical progress between Wittgenstein’s first and second philosophies, I highlight how the main issue in Wittgenstein’s first philosophy is also the main issue in his second philosophy: the fact that Wittgenstein has never followed his own methods.