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Collective Agency and Coalitional Power in Games
This paper explores how insights from the philosophy of collective agency can inform the development of coalition logic, focusing particularly on the conceptual distinctions among intentionality, preference, and coalitional power as foundational elements. While the interdisciplinary discussion mainly adopts a philosophical perspective, we also propose specific directions for broadening and refining coalition logic through philosophical theories. This expansion sheds light on phenomena often overlooked by logicians, including unstable joint actions, exogenous power, and the role of coalitional structures.
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