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The Philosophy of Doubt: How Descartes’ Methodical Skepticism Explains Cognitive Biases and Misinformation
This paper examines Descartes’ methodic skepticism as a cognitive strategy for combating cognitive biases and misinformation. By linking his systematic doubt to modern theories of epistemic vigilance and metacognition, it explores whether skepticism reinforces critical thinking or creates excessive distrust, ultimately shaping our ability to discern truth in the digital age.
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