Trustless Trust and Antitrust: A Synthesis

Authors have written of antitrust’s demise in the face of blockchain technology which, supposedly, achieves the goals of the law, through private ordering, without a need for the law. Most importantly of all, public permissionless blockchains offer the vision of disintermediation – the end of the platform economy troubling many scholars today. At the same time, blockchain technology presents challenges to the doctrine and enforcement of antitrust. Finally, blockchain community governance allows for private ordering of antitrust, i.e., enforcement of rules attempting to protect competition, which are at the same time illegal, not coming from the courts or agencies they constitute competition wrongs themselves. I argue that all three claims are overstated and propose a synthesis of the law and code. The legal doctrine can be modified to tackle the novel technological landscape quite easily, with adoption of novel legal fictions. This is necessary since blockchains – both public and even more so private ones – while ingenious, do not remove a need for the law to protect the market from anti-competitive conduct. Indeed, even public ledgers have power structures allowing for abuse, while private blockchains may, in fact, allow for its proliferation. The law, thus, needs to find a regulatory access point to the ledgers. This is not an easy task: however, cooperation of blockchains with the law, and encoding of antitrust rules on the ledgers themselves, offers a possibility of a reconciliation between the law and the code. At the same time, this lends legitimacy to pro-competitive actions of those cyberspace communities and ensures a preservation of the rule of law. This is the blockchain antitrust synthesis.