Structural Dissolution of the Gettier Problem _through Address-Theoretic Ontology_

Edmund Gettier's 1963 paper in Analysis demonstrated that justified true belief (JTB) is insufficient for knowledge: justification and truth can coincide accidentally, yielding a justified true belief that, intuitively, is not knowledge. Sixty years of responses have produced no consensus solution. Zagzebski (1994) establishes that no analysis of the form K = df true belief + X can escape Gettier cases given fallibilism. We argue that the impasse has a structural source: all parties share the assumption that justification is a property of the epistemic subject’s mental or inferential states, specifiable independently of the truth-making state of affairs. This paper introduces an alternative architecture drawn from the Modulign Standard — a Dimensional Address Grammar for Observable Reality developed independently for the practical classification of observational data. The architecture replaces the justification condition with a requirement of constitutive world-engagement: a classification procedure is epistemically adequate only if each of its steps directly engages the observable features causally produced by the truth-making state of affairs, with no step epistemically isolated from those features. This yields the Address-Theoretic Non-Accidentality Principle (ATNA) and the Address-Theoretic Knowledge (ATK) formulation. Under ATK, Gettier cases cannot arise because the structural precondition for their arising — the logical independence of the justificatory state from the truth-making state — is absent from the architecture. This result, which we term structural dissolution, is stronger than any fourth-condition solution and differs from knowledge-first dissolution in preserving the analysis project. The argument is restricted to observational knowledge; its scope boundary is honest and architecturally encoded rather than asserted in prose.