Schelling on Reason, Revelation, and the Moons of Jupiter

At various points in his long career, Schelling affirms central doctrines of Christianity (like the Incarnation) while claiming to do philosophy. His incorporation of religious doctrine into philosophy has long been controversial, and it raises questions about the relationship of reason to revelation, as well as the relationship of philosophy to faith. In this article, I focus on Schelling’s complex answers to such questions in his late philosophy, using as a guide a remarkable analogy he introduces in the Philosophy of Revelation: knowing the truths of revelation is like seeing the moons of the planet Jupiter. My main interpretative claim is this: Schelling stakes out a position on revelation that is unique in the history of philosophy insofar as he makes revelation both essential and unessential for true philosophy. That paradoxical formulation reflects a fundamental tension in his approach to revelation that has largely been neglected by Schelling scholarship. In the last part of the paper, I pose critical questions about Schelling’s position that arise out of that fundamental tension. In particular, I ask whether, despite Schelling’s claims, his approach presupposes a faith commitment—and thus whether his philosophy of revelation would be more accurately labeled “philosophical theology.”