Event Horizon of the Mind: Wittgenstein, Black Holes, and the Limits of Determinism in Neuroscience

This paper argues that a central physicalist inference trades on a structural slide from descriptive completeness to content fixation. The inference conflates three theses: that a complete non-normative base fixes physical trajectory, that richer descriptive bases constrain which contents are admissible, and that the base uniquely fixes which admissible content is correct. Only the third thesis yields unique reconstruction. The argument has two pillars. A Reconstructability Lemma shows that unique reconstruction at a base requires injectivity of the map from total state to accessible base, and the black hole information paradox serves as a proof of existence that global dynamical completeness can coexist with reconstruction failure at a projected base. A Wittgensteinian argument then shows that the analogous failure is actual for content, because no purely descriptive enrichment fixes which public norm is correctness-fixing. This yields a forced fork: either one stays within a purely descriptive base and fails to secure fixation, or one restores fixation by importing normative selection. At points where content is efficacious, the content-sensitive successor description is therefore set-valued relative to the descriptive base, and no context-invariant brain-only bijective decoder exists there in principle. If content is determinate in ordinary use, the further consequence is non-supervenience of content on even a maximally enriched non-normative base. The constructive upshot is normative complementarity: physics describes trajectories, while normative theory fixes correctness, within a duplex science of minded systems.