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The Role of Explanation in the Epistemology of Grounding
Despite the tight connection between grounding and explanation, Thompson (2016) and Maurin (2019) have recently argued that explanation cannot be an epistemic guide to ground. Skiles & Trogdon (2021) disagree. Reconstructing Thompson’s and Maurin’s worry about grounding and explanation as a dilemma, they argue that one of the horns of this dilemma can be resisted, such that explanation can be an epistemic guide to ground. In this paper, I offer a different solution by showing that the other horn of the respective dilemma can be resisted as well. I show that the present solution is preferable to Skiles & Trogdon’s (2021).
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