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The Principles and the Presumption of Equality
This chapter advocates the presumption of equality as a possible candidate for a principle to proceed from basic moral premises to a theory of rights and justice. It introduces the presumption of equality as a necessary feature of any conception of just distribution. This requires that everyone, regardless of individual differences, should have an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of relevant differences justify, on universally acceptable grounds, unequal distribution. After assessing different justifications of and objections against the presumption of equality, the chapter offers a substantive justification of the presumption that links it back to the basic notions of justice, justification, and moral and social equality.
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