A New Conceptual Framework of Meta-Theories and Meta-Discourses

Contemporary developments in meta-theory have blurred the boundaries between major positions and, with them, the responsibilities of meta-theorists to sustain substantive demarcations between rival views. The recent debate over the problem of Creeping Minimalism (PCM) vividly illustrates this difficulty. As attempts to solve PCM have appeared to falter, theorists have increasingly disagreed not only about how it should be resolved, but also about whether it is really a serious problem, and if so, for whom. This paper proposes a new conceptual framework of meta-theories to address that broader theoretical and terminological muddle. The framework clarifies the nature of meta-discourses, specifies the purpose and responsibility of meta-theories, and reinterprets PCM accordingly. On the view defended here, principal meta-theories are answerable for sustaining a principled and substantive demarcation between the discourses they treat as realist and anti-realist. PCM is therefore best understood as a heavyweight demarcation problem for expressivism: expressivists must either identify a substantive distinction between expressive and non-expressive discourses that survives minimalist pressure or reject the move to minimalism. Reconsolidating expressivism with realism, or appealing to global expressivism, is not a satisfactory solution.