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What Mathematical Theories of Truth Should be Like (and Can be)
Hannes Leitgeb formulated eight norms for theories of truth in his paper [5]: `What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)'. We shall present in this paper a theory of truth for suitably constructed languages which contain the first-order language of set theory, and prove that it satisfies all those norms.
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