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"The 'Causes' of the Hard Problem"
This note calls attention to the fact that efficient causes – the sort of cause that changes something or makes something happen – can play no constitutive role in the immediate, cognitively conscious relation between cognitive subject and a cognit-ive object. It notes that: (1) it is a necessary condition for an efficient causal relation that it alter its relata; and (2) it is a necessary condition for a conscious cognitive relat-ion that it does not alter its relata. This has important implication for the theories of knowledge and consciousness, the “Hard Problem,” and related puzzles.
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