The Acceptance of the Epicurean Thesis on Pleasure as the Absence of Pain

The Acceptance of the Epicurean Thesis on Pleasure as the Absence of Pain In this paper, I will argue that the Epicurean thesis on pleasure (hēdonē) as the absence of pain is a true claim and, moreover, is plausible. First, I will give justifications for the acceptance of pleasure as the absence of pain, as the Epicureans intended it to be understood. Then, I will offer further justification for the acceptance of a more extreme thesis on pleasure, specifically the Epicurean thesis which is interpreted to mean that the greatest pleasure occurs in the complete absence of pain. In order to do this, I present the following premises to support the irrefutability of the Epicurean thesis on pleasure. For the first premise, I present the Epicurean belief of the blessed life with respect to the pleasure-pain relationship. Forthe second premise, I discuss the extent to which Epicurean pleasure is hedonistic in nature. For the third premise, I show that, in the Epicurean philosophy, there is calculation of pleasure and pain, which is an important contributing factor to the plausibility of the thesis. Thus, the premises support the plausibility and, in fact, lead to the coherent acceptance of the Epicurean thesis on pleasure as the absence of pain and, more specifically, the greatest pleasure as the complete absence of pain.