PhilArchive
open access
Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology
Psychologists and philosophers use the term 'intuition' for a variety of different phenomena. In this paper, I try to provide a kind of a roadmap of the debates, point to some confusions and problems, and give a brief sketch of an empirically respectable philosophical approach.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Relying on Intuitions in Moral and Political Philosophy: A Practice with No Support#100387
- Sensitive to Reasons: Moral Intuition and the Dual Process Challenge to Ethics#709705
- Moral intuition#700252
- Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics#763281
- Moral knowledge, epistemic externalism, and intuitionism#770183
Record · ID 744096
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive