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Internalized Norms and Intrinsic Motivations: Are Normative Motivations Psychologically Primitive?
My modest aim in this piece is to frame and illuminate some of the issues surrounding normative motivation, rather than take a firm position on any of them. I begin by clarifying the key terms in my title of this essay, and unpacking some of the assumptions that underpin its question. I then distinguish four kinds of answers one might give. In this short essay I will not be able to properly develop and evaluate an argument for the view that normative motivations are psychologically primitive, but I will have some comments about what such an argument might look like, and what it would have to show.
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