PhilArchive
open access
Many-One Identity and the Trinity
Trinitarians claim there are three Divine persons each of which is God, and yet there is only one God. It seems they want three to equal one. It just so happens, some metaphysicians claim exactly that. They accept Composition as Identity: each fusion is identical to the plurality of its parts. I evaluate Composition as Identity's application to the doctrine of the Trinity, and argue that it fails to give the Trinitairan any options he or she didn't already have. Further, while Composition as Identity does give us a new way to assert polytheism, its help requires us to endorse a claim that undercuts any Trinitarian motivation for the view.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Two Peas in a Single Polytheistic Pod: Richard Swinburne and John Hick#740851
- A Plural Reference Interpretation of Three-Dimensional Syntactic Trees#754467
- Embodiment, Divinity, and New Theological Directions in William James and Ralph Barton Perry#723473
- In Defense of Hierarchy: A Response to Levi Bryant's 'A Logic of Multiplicities: Deleuze, Immanence, and Onticology'#757992
- The Trinity and the Light Switch: Two Faces of Belief#118054
Record · ID 745274
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive