Towards a More Comprehensive Interpretation of Kant’s Ethics: The Case of Those Who Are Viewed Only as Means

The aim of this paper is to investigate Kant’s ethics regarding his views on non-human animals in order to distinguish whether and in which sense does Kant’s moral principle oblige us to treat animals with dignity. First, we shall provide a review of Kant’s basic moral views in order to consider whether it is justified for non-human animals to be excluded from moral laws. We shall claim that this exclusion is not justified and that it is a consequence of another, inherent problem that makes Kant’s ethics vulnerable to the argument from marginal cases. Christine Korsgaard’s solution to the problem of non-human animal moral status shall be considered and we shall attempt to show that it solves the original inherent problem as well. In conclusion, with a help from Donald VanDeVeer’s distinction, we shall provide a more precise addition to Korsgaard’s solution and formulate a non-speciest criterion for those cases of conflicted interests between humans and those who are traditionally viewed as a means instead of ends-in themselves.