Arendt’s Institution of Forgiveness for “Radical Evil”

This paper examines the limitations of Hannah Arendt’s institutions of forgiveness and promise as articulated in The Human Condition, particularly in relation to acts of "radical evil." While Arendt posits that certain atrocities are unforgivable due to their capacity to rupture the fabric of human relationality and freedom, this position undermines her own concepts of natality, action, and the unpredictability inherent in human plurality. I argue that excluding radical evil from the domain of forgiveness creates a theoretical and ethical impasse that prevents meaningful political and moral renewal. Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s conception of unconditional forgiveness, I propose an alternative framework in which forgiveness, even of the unforgivable functions as an extraordinary, transformative act that resists normalization and allows for the re-creation of political life. This paper contends that such an approach better accommodates the complexities of modern atrocities and aligns more coherently with the ethical imperatives of relationality, freedom, and responsibility in a pluralistic world.