PhilArchive
open access
Three Reasons for Knowing Other than Knowing Otherwise: A Reply to Alexis Shotwell
In this article, I raise three potential objections to Alexis Shotwell’s view of “implicit knowledge,” which she presents in her book Knowing Otherwise.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The Primacy of Knowledge: A Critical Survey of Timothy Williamson's Views on Knowledge, Assertion and Scepticism#740465
- On Being Ignorant#17764
- Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths#763810
- When Not Knowing Is Knowing Better#173765
- You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework#83765
Record · ID 752990
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive