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Ought, Can, and Presupposition: A Reply to Kurthy and Lawford-Smith
I report the results of a follow-up study, designed to address concerns raised by Kurthy and Lawford-Smith in response to my original study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Like the results of the original study, the results of the follow-up study do not support the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. The results of both studies suggest that OIC is probably not a principle of ordinary moral cognition. As I have argued in my paper, I take this to mean that OIC can no longer be taken as axiomatic. It must be argued for without appealing to intuitions.
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