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Philosophy of Emotions
In the epistemological context, two questions have a special relevance: "are emotions knowledge?" and "is a uniform theory of emotions necessary to evaluate the epistemological state of emotions?". A restrictive interpretation of "knowledge" requires theories to have propositional content. In such a case, emotions are usually assimilated to normative beliefs or judgments. More liberal interpretations of "knowledge" also include theories that interpret emotions on the perception model. A minimal definition of cognitive theories of emotions includes the assertion that emotions are intentional. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11326.72004
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