PhilArchive
open access
Understanding the Role and Nature of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry
This thesis explores the role and nature of intuition in philosophical inquiry. Appeals to intuition have either been used as evidence for or against philosophical theories or as constitutive features of judgement. I attempt to understand our uses of intuition by appealing to tacit knowledge. The hope is to elicit a picture of intuition as being practical and explanatory. Our reliance on intuition is warranted if we understand it as an expression of tacit knowledge.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The reality of the intuitive#711045
- The Purpose of Knowledge Is to Know: A First-Principles Framework#118528
- Kahneman’s Error: Dual-Process Theory, Instrumental Rationality, and the Foreclosure of the Determination of Ends#693775
- Generative Uncertainty: Embracing Epistemic Friction as a Philosophical Virtue#1169595
- Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry#765334
Record · ID 757012
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive