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The Prolog Inference Model refutes Tarski Undefinability
The generalized conclusion of the Tarski and Gödel proofs: All formal systems of greater expressive power than arithmetic necessarily have undecidable sentences. Is not the immutable truth that Tarski made it out to be it is only based on his starting assumptions. When we reexamine these starting assumptions from the perspective of the philosophy of logic we find that there are alternative ways that formal systems can be defined that make undecidability inexpressible in all of these formal systems.
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