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Phenomenal Concepts and Incomplete Understanding
It is often thought that acquiring a phenomenal concept requires having the relevant sort of experience. In "Extending Phenomenal Concepts", Andreas Elpidorou defends this position from an objection raised by Michael Tye (in "Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts"). Here, I argue that Elpidorou fails to attend to important supporting materials introduced by Tye.
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