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Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons
We often say that one reason is stronger, or weightier, than another. These are metaphors. What does normative strength or weight really consist in? Scanlon (2014) offers a novel answer in terms of counterfactuals. I argue that this appeal to counterfactuals creates deep problems for his view.
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