Kochen–Specker contextuality as an obstruction to global attitude attribution: A sheaf-theoretic no-go result for theory of mind

A prevalent modelling ideal in theory of mind (ToM) treats attitude attribution as a contextindependent assignment of determinate truth-values to a fixed stock of attributed answers. We formalize this ideal as the existence of a global section of the event presheaf over a cover of jointly answerable attribution-queries, in the sense of the sheaf-theoretic semantics of contextuality [1]. Using a parity (Mermin–Peres) configuration [4] as a combinatorial witness of Kochen–Specker-type no-go structure [3], we prove that there exist finite ToM-attribution scenarios in which every context admits classical (bivalent) assignments satisfying its internal coherence constraints, yet no global assignment exists. The obstruction is strong contextuality: no global section is compatible with all local supports [1]. We then delineate two conservative repairs that preserve within-context classicality while rejecting global bivalence: presheaf-local semantics for attributed attitudes and an internal (Heyting) semantics over the context poset, in the spirit of topos-theoretic quantum logic [2, 5].