PhilArchive
open access
Can the self be a brain?
Philosophical materialists suggest that a person can be identified with their brain. My paper is a critical investigation of this provocative thesis and an analysis of some of the prominent arguments to support this view. My overall argument is that there is more to this issue than some philosophers appear to acknowledge.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The Illusion Called Mind: Is Consciousness Beyond the Brain?#85656
- Distributed Cognition, Neuroprostheses and their Implications to Non-Physicalist Theories of Mind#737359
- Digital twins for trans people in healthcare: queer, phenomenological and bioethical considerations#723570
- Recognition and the Human Life-Form: Beyond Identity and Difference#701316
- Hard Problems in the Philosophy of Mind#96411
Record · ID 765889
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive