Conceptio › Archive › PhilArchive
PhilArchive open access

The Mint Method: Rethinking Morality with Kant and Mill

French, Esteban
PhilArchive · Papers
Open Source ↗
philosophy
The perennial problem of determining what constitutes moral rightness has elicited divergent responses from major figures in moral philosophy, most notably Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Kant’s deontological ethics grounds moral obligation in the universality of the Categorical Imperative, while Mill’s utilitarianism evaluates right action by its contribution to the greatest aggregate happiness. Despite their influence, both frameworks are subject to substantial critique: Kantian ethics is frequently faulted for its inflexibility in morally exigent contexts, whereas Millian utilitarianism risks subordinating individual rights to collective welfare. This paper advances a synthetic framework, termed the Mint Method, which seeks to reconcile these deficiencies by integrating the Kantian demand for universally binding principles with Mill’s consequentialist sensitivity to outcomes. The Mint Method is structured around three components: (1) the preservation of universal moral prohibitions to provide rational stability, (2) the conditional allowance of exceptions in extraordinary circumstances where strict adherence would result in severe injustice, and (3) the evaluation of such exceptions through consequential considerations oriented toward human dignity and collective well-being. This synthesis aims not to dissolve the tension between deontology and consequentialism, but to exploit it productively in the service of a more resilient ethical system. The resulting framework, while concededly imperfect, aspires to be less susceptible to arbitrariness, manipulation, and moral failure than either Kantian rigorism or Millian consequentialism in isolation.
Conceptio Open Archive

Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio

Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.

This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗

Related documents

Record · ID 76794
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive