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Back to 'normal'
In a recent article, Jon Bebb (2023, Analysis) has argued that we have no reason to believe, contrary to what is often assumed, that ‘normal’ is ambiguous between a statistical and a normative sense. I argue that his case rests on two false premisses, and that we have very good reasons to believe that ‘normal’ is, in fact, ambiguous in this way. As part of my argument, I will go on to suggest that if ‘normal’ is ambiguous between a statistical and a normative sense, that is because of the deep but seldom recognized connection between regularities and rules. This suggestion, if correct, will in turn help us elucidate three familiar thoughts about normality.
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