FISGuard: Defending Against Membership Inference via Fixed Input Subspaces

[2608.27836] FISGuard: Defending Against Membership Inference via Fixed Input Subspaces Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Computer Science > Cryptography and Security arXiv:2608.27836 (cs) [Submitted on 28 Aug 2026] Title: FISGuard: Defending Against Membership Inference via Fixed Input Subspaces Authors: Haocheng Jiang , Hua Shen View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: As large language models are increasingly adopted in federated learning, protecting user privacy while performing parameter-efficient fine-tuning on distributed private data has become an important challenge. Although clients only share gradients instead of directly uploading raw data, the shared gradients may still leak membership information about training samples. ProjRes (S&P, 2026) further increases this risk: with less information and without accessing model outputs, an attacker can effectively distinguish members from non-members solely based on the projection residual between a candidate representation and the subspace induced by server-observable gradients. Existing defenses against membership inference mostly rely on gradient perturbation or regularization, which can not only degrade model utility but also fail to effectively defend against the membership inference attack introduced by ProjRes, which exploits the geometric structure of gradients. To address this issue, we propose FISGuard, a lightweight defense. Its key idea is to construct and fix a low-dimensional representation subspace using independent public data, thereby restricting the space through which private representations are exposed via gradients while preserving the primary information required for downstream tasks. This substantially reduces the projection-residual discrepancy between members and non-members. We evaluate FISGuard against five representative defense methods across three NLP datasets, two LLMs, and two fine-tuning strategies, Adapter and LoRA. The results show that FISGuard reduces the ProjRes attack AUC to near the random-guessing level of 0.5 in most settings, while maintaining downstream task performance close to that of the undefended model and introducing only limited computational overhead, thereby achieving a favorable privacy--utility trade-off. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC) Cite as: arXiv:2608.27836 [cs.CR] (or arXiv:2608.27836v1 [cs.CR] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.27836 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Haocheng Jiang [ view email ] [v1] Fri, 28 Aug 2026 02:06:37 UTC (524 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Additional Features Audio Summary Current browse context: cs.CR < prev | next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.DC References & Citations SciX Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab)

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