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Monopoly, Product Quality, and Costly Information
A seller offers a buyer a schedule of transfers and associated product qualities. After observing this schedule, the buyer chooses a flexible costly signal about his type. We show it is without loss to focus on a class of allocations that compensate the buyer for his marginal learning costs. In the
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