Virtue is Rare: A Sage for the Situationist

John Doris's critique of virtue ethics points to a potential challenge for virtue ethics, namely, how virtue theory can remain generally applicable in spite of the fact that virtue is rare. This seems to point to an underlying assumption of virtue ethics, which takes for granted moral education and the possibility of moral development while accepting the rarity of those who become wholly virtuous. Virtue is rare, but the difficulties that emerge from Doris's critique are not a result from the rarity of virtue, but rather from a misunderstanding of virtue theory, and moral cultivation. It is my contention that Doris does not recognize the value virtue theory places in both the manifestation of virtue and the possibility of moral success in certain stages of moral cultivation. Utilizing the Confucian virtue theory of Mengzi, I will demonstrate how his theory puts to rest the objections Doris puts forward by invoking the rarity of virtue, as Mengzi promotes a theory that has as its foundation a description of behavioral moral virtues, while maintaining the rarity of the sage. I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis.