Referentialism about Names

Referentialism and descriptivism hail from two major opposing camps in the semantic theory of meaning within the philosophy of language. Referentialism argues that the meaning of proper names is tied up directly and exhaustively in their reference. Conversely, descriptivism contends that the definite description(s) about certain associated properties of a reference constitutes the meaning of names. In this paper, I present a case for referentialism as the definitive theory of meaning by underscoring its motivations while addressing the puzzles contested by descriptivists. Referentialism is motivated by parsimony. It escapes the problems of modality, aprioricity, analyticity, ignorance or lack of description, and erroneous attribution faced by descriptivists. As a drawback, referentialism encounters the puzzles of cognitive value, belief reports, and empty names. I respond to the corresponding objections and sketch a few suggestions for solving them.