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Induction and the rule of succession through a possibilistic inferential model lens
Induction is the process by which empirical evidence is transformed to knowledge. Hume famously argued---and Popper and others agree---that there can be no logical justification for induction. A weaker form of induction, due to Bayes, expresses the aforementioned knowledge in terms of probabilities,
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