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Physical Objects as Possibilities for Experience: Michael Pelczar's _Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience_.
Every metaphysical system must take something as fundamental and unanalyzed, something to which everything else ultimately reduces. Most philosophers today prefer to conceive fundamental reality as non-mental and categorical. This leaves them seeking to reduce the mental to the non-mental and the dispositional to the categorical. Pelczar proposes to invert this picture, putting experience and chance at the foundation and attempting to explain the non-mental and categorical features of our world in their terms. The resulting view, which he calls phenomenalism, takes physical objects to be possibilities (or tendencies) for experience.
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