Kant on Prejudice

Although Kant’s view of the rational subject has been enormously influential, less attention has been paid to his account of what occurs when a subject fails to reflect on her reasons and falls under the influence of what he calls prejudice. My first goal in this paper is to explain Kant’s definition of prejudice by drawing on related discussions scattered across his published texts, notes and lectures. Next, I discuss his prescriptions for how prejudice can be identified and overcome. Although he is often portrayed as requiring subjects to internally monitor their beliefs and intentions, I show that he in fact takes individual reflection to be a limited tool. Rather, he argues that communication with other subjects can be indispensable in fully overcoming prejudice. Finally, I argue that Kant’s account successfully avoids either over- or under- intellectualizing prejudice. In allowing that subjective causes like a subject’s associations and inclinations can lead her to judge and act in prejudiced ways, I suggest that he anticipates contemporary discussions of implicit bias. At the same time, however, he continues to maintain that a subject is rationally accountable for her prejudices, since, on his view, she can always refrain from unreflectively endorsing her associations and inclinations.