arXiv (All)
open access
PhantomCall: Evading ML Malware Detectors via Function Call Graph Perturbation
Prior adversarial attacks on Windows PE malware detectors target raw bytes, PE headers, or intra-function control-flow graphs, leaving the function call graph (FCG) unexplored as an attack surface. Yet the FCG structure is an important feature in graph-based malware detectors. We present Phan- tomCa
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- PIIGuard: Mitigating PII Harvesting under Adversarial Sanitization#157313
- The Invisible Checkpoint: Passive LTE Traffic Capture for Mobile Malware DetectionWhitepaperDigital Forensics and Incident Response, Cyber Defense11 Aug 2026Garo Sinanian#443585
- Adversarial Malware Generation in Linux ELF Binaries via Semantic-Preserving Transformations#134496
- SeqShield: A Behavioral Analysis Approach to Uncover Rootkits#138850
- CVE-2026-90773 — LOW 2.4#785973
Record · ID 820721
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive