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Freemium Model for Information Provision
The paper explores a theoretical freemium model for the sale of information, drawing on mathematical tools used in the study of repeated zero-sum games and Bayesian persuasion. Unlike standard Bayesian persuasion models, the information seller (IS) is indifferent to the actions taken by the informat
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